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Conference Report
The conference “Neuroscience and Pragmatism: Produc-
tive Prospects” was held on June 10, 2011 at the Poto-
mac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, Virginia.
The program was organized by John Shook (Buffalo)
and Tibor Solymosi (Southern Illinois). James Giordano,
Director of the Center for Neurotechnology Studies and
Vice President for Academic Programs at the Potomac
Institute, was the conference co-chair and host. The
conference was supported by The Society of Philoso-
phers in America, the American Philosophical Associa-
tion, and the Center for Neurotechnology Studies of the
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
This conference brought together some pragmatist
philosophers interested in neuroscience and some neu-
roscientists interested in pragmatism. There was much
audience participation, including Q&A after each pre-
sentation, discussion through the luncheon, and audi-
ence discussion with a panel of speakers for an
extended conversation. The speakers were: William
Casebeer (cognitive science, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency-DARPA, USA); Anthony Chemero
(neurophilosophy, Franklin and Marshall College, PA,
USA); David Franks (sociology, Virginia Commonwealth
University, VA, USA); James Giordano (neuroscience
and neuroethics, Center for Neurotechnology Studies of
the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA,
USA, and Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of
Oxford, UK); Teed Rockwell (cognitive science, Sonoma
State University, CA, USA); Jay Schulkin (biophysics and
cognitive science, Georgetown University, Washington,
DC, USA); John Shook (neuroethics and pragmatism,
University at Buffalo, NY, USA); Tibor Solymosi (neuro-
philosophy, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale,
IL, USA).
The speakers reminded the audience that America’s
first generation of pragmatists designed its theories
about experience, mind, and knowledge in light of the
discoveries of biology and psychology during their era.
Viewing organisms entirely naturalistically and under-
standing human brains in light of evolution led pragma-
tists to radically re-conceive how intelligence works.
The pragmatists were America’s first cognitive scientists.
Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George
Mead knew the laboratory intimately and published in
experimental psychology and sociology. They possessed
few details on the specific functions of the brain’s many
components, but they were innocent of errors which
later philosophers perpetuated. For example, the prag-
matists noticed how the brain grows and changes in
youth and they figured that the brain grew new tissue
and modified its interconnections throughout the life-
time. They assumed correctly the later Hebbian idea
that brain tissues activated together would be more
likely to stay functionally related thereafter. They
inferred that the expansion of experience and the
growth of brain structure was correlated, explaining
how learning consists of acquisition of workable habits
for practical success in managing environing conditions.
They judged that much of the brain’s work occurs at
non-conscious levels. They denied that cognition con-
sists entirely of internal representations about static
external matters rationalistically manipulated within a
Cartesian theater, and they denied that perception, cog-
nition, emotion, and volition were discrete processes.
Their psychologies, while mildly behavioristic, were
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distinctly human capacities from language to science
depend on social training, extended cognition, experi-
mental problem-solving, and cultural accumulation of
knowledge. Outspoken on knowledge and truth, their
varieties of pragmatism claimed that only social groups
set working criteria for truth and produce knowledge
from coordinated experimental inquiry.
Pragmatism never dominated philosophy and was
mostly discarded by later successive positivisms and
rationalisms, but its social behaviorism and evolutionary
anthropology filtered into many of the social sciences.
Experimental psychology and cognitive science then
rediscovered many pragmatist views of brain cognition
and learning in the 1980s and 90s, and the first decade
of the 21st century accelerated this trend back to prag-
matism. Since active scientists are less concerned with
the history or philosophical aspects of their particular
fields, it comes as no surprise that most brain scientists
are presently unaware of pragmatism.
William Casebeer took up the question, “What is
Neuropragmatism? Some Principles and Why They
Matter.” He addressed some specific ways that findings
of the contemporary neurosciences support a form of
pragmatism, especially linking with views of John Dewey
and Charles Peirce. Neuroscience is providing some
insight into what is means to be an evolved, embodied
organism coping with the adaptive demands of life.
Such guiding principles as “Abduction come naturally,”
“Action is prior to representation,” “Fast and frugal is
fine,” and “Building models is better than finding laws”
shape the right account of how human intelligence
works. These principles additionally highlight how prag-
matic naturalism can be made consistent with our epis-
temic and moral norms without doing undue violence
to our intuitions about either.
Teed Rockwell continued this neuropragmatist theme
with his presentation on “How Computational Neu-
roscience Revealed that the Pragmatists Were Right.”
Rockwell first discussed the work of Paul Churchland,
who has rejected pragmatism yet he does refer to him-
self as a “closet pragmatist.” The pragmatism he rejects,
however, is a straw slogan that bears little resemblance
to the rich and complex philosophy of the original prag-
matists. Furthermore, much of Churchland’s best work
provides both empirical justification and philosophical
clarification of the epistemology of classical pragmatism.
Rockwell criticized Churchland’s attempt to distance
himself from pragmatism while praising both Church-
land’s unique brand of pragmatism, and the original
pragmatism of James and Dewey for which Churchland
provides fresh scientific support. Since successful beha-
vioral coordination always has cognitive aspects, unne-
cessary isolation of cognition from conduct is neither
warranted by brain evidence or by evolution.
Unscientific notions about cognition restrained by artifi-
cial philosophical concepts like “narrow content,”
semantic state spaces,” and “mind-brain identity”
obstruct neuroscience’s trend towards broad content,
externalism, anti-representationalism, and radical
empiricism. Computational representationism relies on
extreme brain modularity and functional portability
(mechanical modes) but organic brains don’t have such
features. Only learned habitual activity can connect a
person’s language to the world, and trained dynamical
systems can only approximate truth, as Churchland
himself admits.
Like Rockwell, Anthony Chemero defended extended
cognition, announcing “The End of the Debate over
Extended Cognition.” The philosophical debate over
extended cognition has one clear point of consensus:
whether cognitive systems sometimes encompass por-
tions of the environment is an empirical question. This
suggests that a clear laboratory demonstration of an
extended cognitive system should end the debate once
and for all. Chemero explained a series of laboratory
demonstrations of extended human-tool and human-
human cognitive systems, culminating in a set of experi-
ments designed explicitly to test the thesis of extended
cognition. Those tests decisively favor Gibson’s theory
of environmental affordances and the reality of extended
cognition, so if the debate over extended cognition really
is empirical, it should be over. Moreover, the empirical
evidence strongly suggests that whenever cognition is
extended, so too is conscious experience. However, Che-
mero pointed out that the debate will continue, because
deniers of extended cognition simply re-define “cogni-
tion” as metaphysically “internal” and possessing “intrin-
sic content” in order to avoid empirical refutation.
Jay Schulkin covered wide territory in his talk on
“Pragmatism, Naturalism, and the Brain.” The classical
pragmatists (James, Peirce, Dewey, Mead) understood
some fundamental things about action, inquiry, and the
brain. Their goal, a modern one, was an understanding
of cognitive adaptation and learning, along with what
Dewey called “lived experience,” in the context of evolu-
tion of the brain. We now know that cognitive systems
are not simply cortical but traverse all regions of the
brain, something Dewey suggested in his 1896 paper
“The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology.” Any biologi-
cally grounded view of brain function understands that
bodily sensibility is essential for the diverse ways in
which we explore the world. We are oriented to kinds
of objects in a world that we are trying to understand.
Minds inhabit bodies in cephalic systems that explore
the world, and cognitive systems are embodied in real
life events – the stuff of adaptation, long noted by Dar-
win and James and incorporated by Dewey. A core fea-
ture of the pragmatist tradition is the embodiment of
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problem solving in the mind/brain. All forms of dualism
are undermined by the pragmatists. Indeed, cognitive/
behavioral capacities are ways to engage the world, to
compute probability and assess, for example, friendly or
non-friendly social events. We come prepared by neural
circuits to respond to kinds of objects. Diverse cognitive
systems (e.g. recognition of animate/inanimate objects,
agents, senses of space, time and statistical relationships)
underlie what Peirce called “abduction” or the genesis of
ideas and problem solving. These biologically-derived
cognitive systems are not divorced from action or per-
ception, but are endemic to them and are distributed
across neural networks in the brain.
Tibor Solymosi spoke on “Reconstruction in and of
Neurophilosophy,” expanding neuropragmatism’s rele-
vance to social and cultural issues. Pragmatism has
resurged explicitly in neopragmatism and implicitly in
neurophilosophy. Neopragmatism has focused on
achieving ideals like freedom without much concern for
experimental science. Neurophilosophy has had great
interest in bringing experimental science to bear on phi-
losophical problems like free will. In doing so, however,
ideals like freedom are often eliminated or dismissed.
Neuropragmatism cuts across these different points of
emphasis by returning to what Dewey called the method
of intelligence, that sees the knowledge provided by the
sciences as the means for achieving our larger aims of
life. The pragmatist project of reconstruction provides
us with the tools to change philosophical and scientific
questions like “do we have free will?” to “how does and
how could freedom work?” In this way, the distinctively
human way of living meaningful and value-driven lives
are brought within the worldview of scientific
naturalism.
David Franks’s presentation centered on “Neurosociol-
ogy and Some Confirmations of Chicago Pragmatism via
Work on Mirror Neurons.” He described how current
research into mirror neurons confirms important
aspects of the pragmatic tradition developed by John
Dewey, George Mead and other philosophers at the
University of Chicago in the 1920s. More specifically,
findings from hard-nosed empirical research confirms
the priority they placed on behavior, especially socially-
oriented behavior. Mead’s theory of the act parallels the
findings of neuroscience, especially by defining objects
in the environment in terms of the possibilities they
hold for human action. Mirror neurons fire not only
when we see others do something but they actually
simulate this behavior on our motor cortex. Franks out-
lined some further research on implications of this the-
ory of the social act for the ways that language is
possible for humans.
John Shook’s talk was on “The Emergence of Morality
and the Social Self.” As sociological and psychological
research is demonstrating, morality as practiced by
humans infrequently rises to the ideal standards set by
ethical theories. Rather than permit abstract theory to
first define morality, it more reasonable to investigate
how actual people conduct their moral lives, where mor-
ality functions for managing interpersonal responsibil-
ities and social relations across large social groups. Why
is morality different than kinship bonds yet still
restrained by relatively local familiarity? Proto-morality
in early hominid species involved kinship emotions like
love and social capacities such as compassion and trust.
As homo sapiens began living in much larger tribal
groups, the peculiar features of morality emerged to
manage social interactions among tribal non-kin as well.
Morality proper consists of generic obligations of non-
maleficence and civil trust to members of one’s in-group
to moderate competition and permit stable cooperation
across lifetimes. Morality is embodied, situated, role-
embedded, habitual, cooperative, and culturally objec-
tive. Humans are capable of morality because we use
social cognition and collective intentionality to actively
control and manage ongoing modes of social interac-
tions. Only the relatively recent rise of nations and
empires did ethical thinking emerge under cultural pres-
sures to deal with social interactions among people lack-
ing common tribal/ethnic heritages and moralities.
Ethics proper generates notions of abstract principles
applied to generic people at all times and places, but
these principles transcend the proper function of moral-
ity while uneasily co-existing along morality.
James Giordano concluded the conference by pulling
together some neuropragmatist and neuroethical themes
in his talk on “What ‘Neuro’ Really Means: Obligations
for Intellectual Honesty and Veracity in Neuroethics.”
Ethics is the study of the processes and basis of moral
decision-making. Neuroethics applies neuroscience to
study the processes of moral cognition, and neuroethics
is in a disciplinary position to help address the wider
ethical, legal, and social issues arising from improved
knowledge of brain functioning. He warned us about
dangers of “neuro-ubiquity” - where adding the ‘neuro’
prefix to just about everything else either adds nothing,
or adds reductionistic overtones that may represent
ampliative arguments that are based upon rather loose
and/or value-laden interpretations of neuroscientific
research and findings. Properly prefixed, the ‘neuro’
reminds us of the brain’s centrality to everything we do,
of the brain’s many complexities requiring multiple
levels of analysis, and of the iterative and contingent
nature of any neuroscientific information. Still, however,
Giordano stressed that neuroscience can, and will,
change our conceptions of human being and our possi-
bilities - but we confront novel questions about balan-
cing what we know with what we may want to make
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possible. He argued that the use of neuroscientific infor-
mation and novel neurotechnologies will call for a prac-
tical neuroethics not bound by traditional ethics or any
simplistic precautionary principle.
This conference achieved an impressively new level of
interdisciplinary understanding of achieved results and
set stages for further investigations. The question of
“Why pragmatism now?” was not ignored. If the beha-
vioral, cognitive, and neurosciences were only achieving
new brain insights with confirmed research, any coinci-
dence with some history of philosophical psychology
would be just that, mere history. However, the broad
tradition of pragmatism is needed now, more than ever.
As each of the speakers took occasion to point out in
different ways, knowledge of brain function rarely stays
within narrow scientific bounds, nor does it stay free
from philosophical interference.
Experts from neuroscience, cognitive science, and psy-
chology are publishing their expansive judgments on
ethical, legal, and social matters ranging from mental
health and criminology all the way to philosophically
resolving the mind-body and free will problems in any
number of diverse ways. Scientists should participate in
such judgments, just as the classical pragmatists did,
and current scientists can benefit from their earlier phi-
losophical explorations across the same territory. But
those explorations always meet staunch resistance. Rival
philosophical views, some disguised within scientific
paradigms and other openly espoused by armchair phi-
losophers, offer up staunch opposition to the new prag-
matist stances all over again. Some speakers went so far
as to propose that “neuropragmatism” is the kind of
neurophilosophy that most fruitfully engages larger cul-
tural questions by adequately dealing with meaningful
values and ethical ideals. At the very least, the classical
pragmatists are quite relevant to today’s concerns at the
intersection of science and culture, and a refreshed and
re-tooled pragmatism will prove useful as well.
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